What is the economic relationship between Philippines and China?

What is the economic relationship between Philippines and China?

China is the Philippines’ top trading partner, export market destination, and import source in 2019, a testament to our stronger bilateral trade relations. The Philippines and China bilateral trade reached close to US$50 Billion in 2019, growing at an average of 17 percent in the last five years.

What does Philippines import from China?

Philippines Imports from China Value Year
Electrical, electronic equipment $6.33B 2019
Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products $3.57B 2019
Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers $3.10B 2019
Iron and steel $1.70B 2019

Is the Philippines a unitary actor in the South China Sea?

This approach eschews the assumption that the Philippines behaves as a unitary actor with a consensus on its China policy in the South China Sea and is thus able to unpack foreign policy behaviour within its key decision-making agents (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016).

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How does Philippine foreign policy evolve over time?

Heydarian proposes that the evolution of Philippine foreign policy remains a ‘function of changes in both the domestic political calculations of the ruling elite factions’ as well as changes in the balance of power in the regional security environment (2017, p.221).

What is the significance of the maritime dispute between China and the Philippines?

The significance of this tension can be contextualised in the ongoing maritime dispute between China and the Philippines, where there exist overlapping territorial claims on the basis of the former’s arguably invalid nine-dash line and the latter’s archipelagic doctrine.

Can US-Philippine military relations contradict Duterte’s Beijing-friendly foreign policy?

Yet, tighter US-Philippine military relations, in the form of bilateral defense exercises, military aid and intelligence sharing targeted at bolstering maritime security against Chinese threats (de Castro, 2017), have seemed to ‘contradict Duterte’s Beijing-friendly foreign policy’ (Heydarian 2019).